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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mecha-
nisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are
stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this
way we cast some doubt on the criticism of \complexity" commonly used against
this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more rened equilibrium concepts, the
dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literature on implemen-
tation with rened equilibrium concepts have claimed that the mechanisms they
propose are \simple" and implement \everything" (in contrast with the canoni-
cal mechanism). The fact that some of these \simple" mechanisms have unstable
equilibria suggests that these statements should be interpreted with some caution.
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1 Introduction
The theory of implementation tries to address the problem of designing games (which in
this literature are called mechanisms) whose equilibria satisfy certain socially desirable
properties but which do not necessitate vast amounts of knowledge by the authorities
to put them in place. Instead, these social arrangements should basically self police
themselves, and the government should only make sure that the rules of the game are
respected by the players.
In the last few years there have been impressive advances in the theory of implementation.
As Sjostrom (1994) points out, `With enough ingenuity the planner can implement \any-
thing"'. This \ingenuity" often involves the construction of complicated games and the
use of rened equilibrium notions. As is often the case in economics, very little attention
has been paid to the issue of how equilibrium is reached, and whether it is stable. The
only exception we know of are the papers of Muench and Walker (1984) and de Trenqua-
lye (1988), who study the local stability of the Groves and Ledyard (1977) mechanism.
But we don't know of studies of more general mechanisms, either in Nash equilibrium
or in some renement of the Nash equilibrium concept; or studies of the issue of global
convergence. This situation is worrisome given the importance of the issues at hand and
the fact that the theory makes normative recommendations. It would not be sensible to
apply these social engineering recipes without rst thinking about whether real people
will achieve the desired outcomes.
This paper tries to understand the eect of taking an adaptive (or evolutionary) dy-
namic approach for the implementation problem. The rst result that we obtain is that
the canonical mechanism for implementation in Nash equilibria (see Maskin 1977, Re-
pullo 1987) has good dynamic properties under some additional assumptions about the
outcomes of the social choice correspondence. If agents play the game repeatedly and re-
place the strategies they use with strategies that obtained higher payos in the past, the
dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium (so the social choice correspondence is imple-
mented) and once the dynamics converge to the equilibrium, they stay there. According
to Jackson (1992) `A nagging criticism of the theory is that the mechanisms used in
the general constructive proofs have \unnatural" features'. Moore (1992) also complains
that the mechanisms for Nash implementation are `highly complex -often employing some
unconvincing device such as an integer game'. Our result shows that unsophisticated
agents using very simple adjustment rules can reach the equilibrium of the mechanism,
and therefore it is possible that the criticism is misplaced. On the other hand it may be
that the critics are right. In this case we hope that our result encourages them to be more
specic about the \complexity" they criticize.
The intuition for why convergence can be achieved with the canonical mechanism is simple.
The structure of the general constructive mechanism is as follows. The agents have to
announce a state of the world, an outcome and an integer. If all agents agree on a state
and an outcome, the outcome is implemented. If one agent disagrees and proposes an
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alternative, there is a test that the alternative has to pass. If it passes the test, the
alternative outcome is implemented, otherwise it is not. A condition called monotonicity
(Maskin 1977) ensures that an alternative will only be proposed if the agents are lying.
The mechanism also species what happens when more than one agent disagrees. In
these cases the mechanism gives the agent who proposed the largest integer her favorite
outcome given the state of the world she announces. It is clear that no situation with
more than one disagreer can be an equilibrium (if the best outcomes of the dierent agents
are dierent), all agents will try to announce higher and higher integers to obtain their
favorite outcomes. This use of integers is what the critics usually complain about.
Integer game constructions, however, help the process of convergence to equilibrium. Since
all disagreement outcomes are bad for somebody and there is an incentive for the harmed
to say the truth and obtain their favorite outcomes, they create a tendency towards
equilibrium. As for the other states, monotonicity destabilizes agreements on something
wrong but (when suitably strengthened) stabilizes agreements on the truth. Having un-
derstood that the \mission" of integer games is to make certain states unpleasant and to
direct the dynamics to the right path, it is not dicult to see that the mechanism can be
modied and the integer games can be substituted by something that plays their same
role. To show this we construct an alternative mechanism that makes use of penalties
and substitutes them for the integer game.
We also examine a mechanism that makes use of a more rened equilibrium concept. We
show that although convergence to the equilibria of these games can be achieved, they are
not very robust. The problem is that drift between strategies that have the same payo
as the equilibrium payo can destabilize the equilibrium outcome. This result is far from
being merely a theoretical curiosity. As Binmore and Samuelson (1996) point out, \the
experimental evidence is now strong that one cannot rely on predictions that depend on
deleting weakly dominated strategies", which is precisely what most of the mechanisms
that use rened equilibrium concepts do. The mechanism we study, which is the one
proposed by Abreu and Matsushima (1994), implements the social choice function in iter-
atively weakly undominated strategies. Besides being a good example of the literature on
implementation with rened equilibrium concepts, it has an additional interest because
it allows us to discuss the mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992). This mechanism
virtually implements the social choice function (that is, it implements the social choice
function with arbitrarily high probability) in strategies that survive the iterative deletion
of strictly dominated strategies. This would seem to be a good mechanism from a dy-
namic perspective, given that iteratively strictly dominated strategies are asymptotically
eliminated for most adaptive dynamics (see Nachbar 1990, Samuelson and Zhang 1992
or Cabrales and Sobel 1992). The problem is that if the mechanism implements with
very high probability the social choice function, then it will do so in iteratively strictly
-undominated strategies, for  very small. This implies that as the mechanism becomes
more eective in doing its job, it becomes closer to the one in Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) and thus it becomes open to the sort of instability problems which that mechanism
has. We think that this trade-o between close implementability and stability needs to
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be pointed out and we formalize it.
Section 2 describes the model and the dynamics we use. Section 3 studies the problem of
Nash implementation with adaptive dynamics, both with the canonical mechanism and
with an alternative that does not use integer games. Section 4 studies the dynamics of
the mechanisms of Abreu and Matsushima (1994) and Abreu and Matsushima (1992).
2 The model and the dynamics
There is a set I = 1; :::; n of agents, and the preferences of agent i 2 I are represented
with a (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function v
i
: A
i
! R, where A is a nite
set of alternatives and 
i
species a nite set of possible utility functions. An element

i
of 
i
is meant to represent the preferences of agent i over A. A preference prole is a
vector  = (
1
; :::; 
n
), where 
i
2 
i
. The set of possible preference proles, denoted by
S, is a subset of  = 
i2N

i
. Since we are concerned with environments with complete
information, the preference proles will be common knowledge among the agents.
A social choice function is a (possibly multi-valued) mapping F : S ! A, where S  
is the set of possible preference proles. A mechanism is a pair (M;g), where M =
M
1
 :::M
n
and g : M ! A. M
i
is the message space of agent i and g is the outcome
function. A mechanism and a preference prole dene a game.
Let M
 i
= M
1
 :::  M
i 1
 M
i+1
:::  M
n
. Given a mechanism (M;g) and a pref-
erence prole , we will say that m
i
is a best response for player i, to m
 i
2 M
 i
if
v
i
(g(m
i
;m
i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m
i
;m
0
i
); 
i
) for all m
0
i
2 M
i
. A message prole m is a Nash equi-
librium (NE) if m
i
is a best response to m
 i
for all i 2 N . Let NE() = fg(m)jm is a
NE at g.
We say that a mechanism (M;g) implements a social choice function F in Nash equilibrium
if for all  2 S, F () = NE().
The main claim of this paper is that the implementation games can only be relevant for
real individuals if one takes into account that an equilibrium of a game will be most of
the time the result of some trial and error process of learning by the agents. In general
there is no guarantee that an equilibrium will be the end product of such process. For
this reason one should study if adjustment processes converge to some equilibrium of
the implementation game. Furthermore, even if an equilibrium is attained it may be
unstable, and stability would also be a desirable characteristic of a game form that is
used to implement a social choice function.
We will assume now that the implementation game is played repeatedly by the agents and
that they can use the information obtained in previous periods to modify their behavior in
subsequent rounds of play. To keep the problem tractable we will make some assumptions
about the way in which the play and the updating takes place.
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Suppose that we have a population with L individuals playing the role of each agent
i, so that the population has a total of Ln individuals. All individuals in the ith role
are endowed with the same preferences 
i
. Let m
ki
be the message sent by individual
k in the role of agent i. A population message prole s = (m
11
; :::;m
1n
; :::;m
L1
; :::;m
Ln
)
species a message for each individual in the population. A population message pro-
le is homogeneous if m
ki
is constant in k, that is, if all individuals in a certain role
use the same message. Let the set S
hom
be the set of all homogeneous message pro-
les. Let s
i
= (m
1i
; :::;m
Li
) and s
 i
= (s
1
; :::; s
i 1
; s
i+1
; :::; s
n
). For a certain mech-
anism (M;g), preference prole , and message prole s let us denote u
ki
(s; 
i
) =
P
L
k
1
=1
:::
P
L
k
i 1
=1
P
L
k
i+1
=1
:::
P
L
k
n
=1
v
i
(g(m
k
1
1
; :::;m
k
i 1
i 1
;m
ki
;m
k
i+1
i+1
; :::;m
k
n
n
; 
i
)
1
L
n 1
.
This utility function would obtain, for example, with uniform random matching, or (sub-
ject to renormalization) if every individual played with everybody else in the population,
before they could change their behavior.
We will say that message m
ki
2M
i
improves upon strategy m
0
ki
given the message prole
s if u
ki
(m
ki
; s
 i
; 
i
)  u
ki
(m
0
ki
; s
 i
; 
i
). We say that m
ki
is a best response to s
 i
if m
ki
improves upon m
0
ki
for all m
0
ki
2 M
i
. Let  > 0. We say that m
ki
is an -improvement
upon m
0
ki
if u
ki
(m
ki
; s
 i
; 
i
) u
ki
(m
0
ki
; s
 i
; 
i
) >  U , where U is the maximumdierence
between payos for all  2 :
We assume that the population starts at some strategy prole and that before the game
is played again one member of the population is allowed to change her strategy. The
dynamics will be fully described when one identies the probability with which each
individual changes her message and the probability with which each message is chosen.
We will assume that the strategy shift will be made with a probability that depends
exclusively on the present state of the population, and that with positive probability only
one member of the population is allowed to change her strategy at any round of play.
Besides this we will use a few other assumptions.
(D1) All individuals change their strategies with positive probabilities.
(D2) Any strategy that improves upon the strategy currently in use is adopted with
positive probability.
(D3) A strategy that does not improve upon the strategy currently in use is adopted
with zero probability.
Two alternatives for assumptions (D2) will be used in sections
(D4) Any strategy that is a best response to the present population prole is adopted
with positive probability.
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(D5) Any strategy that is an -improvement to the present population prole is adopted
with positive probability.
It is important for our results that probabilities be bounded away from zero. This is
implied by our assumptions when the strategy space and the population are nite. In
section 3.1 the strategy spaces are innite. We will use a modication of assumption
(D2) in that section to deal with that problem. These properties make our dynamics very
similar to the ones that Kim and Sobel (1995) use. The dierence here is that (D1) is a
strengthening of their (N1) assumption. When assumption (D4) is used the dynamics are
closely related to the ones in Hurkens (1995), they are also a version for a discrete state
space of the dynamics proposed by Gilboa and Matsui (1991). Assumption (D5) will be
used in the discussion of virtual implementation.
Undoubtedly the dynamics described here are very crude, but one has to bear in mind that
the games we analyze may have very large strategy spaces and the analysis could be very
complicated without some drastic assumptions. We exploit a special characteristic that
the mechanisms that are commonly used in the literature usually have. For many strategy
proles there are many agents who have lots of alternative strategies that yield the same
payo, and this payo may be equivalent or even an improvement with respect to the
one they are presently using. Some degree of variability in the response at those states
will simplify convergence to an equilibrium. This variability is present if assumptions
(D1) and (D2) (or the alternatives to D2) are satised. Assumption (D3) will make some
equilibria absorbing states. These assumptions permit us to obtain clear-cut results in a
relatively simple fashion. Other dynamics that are widely used in the literature may be
less tractable. Nevertheless, a necessary further step would be to study the robustness of
our conclusions to dierent assumptions about the dynamics.
3 Nash implementation
In this section we will argue that the mechanisms that have been used to implement social
choice functions in Nash equilibria have good dynamical properties. In the rst subsection
we will show that the dynamics described in section (2) converge and are stable for the
canonical mechanism. As we said in the introduction, this mechanism has been criticized
for being \highly complex". One can argue that if agents that are as unsophisticated as
the ones we model are able to converge to the equilibrium, the mechanism can hardly
be called \highly complex". We also show that the features that have given the Nash
mechanisms a bad name may not be necessary if the agents get to the equilibrium with
our dynamics. That is the content of the second subsection.
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3.1 The canonical mechanism (almost)
We say that F is monotonic if for all a; ; 
0
, with a 2 F () and a 62 F (
0
) there is an i
and a
0
such that v
i
(a; )  v
i
(a
0
; ) and v
i
(a
0
; 
0
) > v
i
(a; 
0
).
Let b
i
() be such that v
i
(b
i
(); )  v
i
(a; ) for all a 2 A.
Monotonicity is a necessary and almost sucient condition for Nash implementation. We
will use somewhat stronger assumptions,
(N1) For all a; ; 
0
, with a 2 F () and a 62 F (
0
) there is an i and a
0
such that
v
i
(a; ) > v
i
(a
0
; ) and v
i
(a
0
; 
0
) > v
i
(a; 
0
).
(N2) For all i,  and a 2 F () there is a
0
2 A such that v
i
(a; ) > v
i
(a
0
; ), and
v
j
(a
0
; )  v
j
(a; ) for j 6= i.
(N3) For all , a 2 F (), for all j and for all i 6= j v
i
(a; )  v
i
(b
j
(); ).
Let us denote the agent i in assumption (N1) i(; 
0
)
1
, and a
0
be a
0
(; 
0
). Agent i(; 
0
) is
often called the test agent and a
0
(; 
0
) the test outcome in the implementation literature.
Let us also denote by a
0
i
(a; ) the outcome a
0
in assumption (N2).
Under our dynamics, all improving messages are chosen with positive probability. If the
Nash equilibrium of the mechanism were such that some agent had more than one best
response, it could be easily destabilized. To avoid this we will use two assumptions, (N1),
which demands that the test outcome be a strict improvement over the \status quo" and
(N2) by which it is always possible to punish a dissenter who has no reason to dissent
(she is not a test agent) and also make everybody else better o. This will be possible
if, for example, there is a private good and one can levy nes from one agent in terms of
the private good and distribute the proceeds among everybody else. (N3) says that the
social choice outcomes can be no worse for all agents i 6= j than the favorite outcome for
agent j. Suppose, for example, that there is a private good and consuming zero units of
this good is very bad for any agent. Assume also that the favorite outcome for agent j
assigns her all the group's endowment of the private good, and that all outcomes of the
social choice function assign a positive amount of the private good to all agents. In these
conditions assumption (N3) would be satised. Since the mechanism involves that for
certain message proles an agent gets her favorite outcome, this assumption prevents the
dynamics from getting stuck at such a message prole.
We will use a slight variation of the canonical mechanism for implementation in Nash
equilibria, as described, for example in Repullo (1987).
1
If there is more than one agent i which satises the condition, let i(; 
0
) be the one with the lowest
index.
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Let M
i
= ASN , so that each individual announces an outcome, a preference prole,
and a positive integer; and M = M
1
 :::M
n
, and let members of M
i
and M be denoted
m
i
and m respectively. Let the rst component of m
i
, that is, the outcome announced by
agent i be m
1
i
and the second component, the preference prole announced by agent i, be
m
2
i
. Let i(m) be the individual who has the lowest index among those who announce the
highest integer in the message prole m.
To dene g, let's divide M into the following regions,
D
1
= fmj9 2 S; a 2 F () such that for all i; m
i
= (a; ; n
i
); for some n
i
2 Ng
D
2
= fmj8i 6= i(; 
0
);m
i
= (a; ; n
i
)and m
i(;
0
)
= (a
0
(; 
0
); 
0
; n
i(;
0
)
)g
D
3
= fmj8i 6= j;m
i
= (a; ; n
i
)m
j
6= m
i
and either j 6= i(; 
0
)
or j = i(; 
0
) and m
j
6= (a(; 
0
); 
0
; n
i(;
0
)
)g
D
4
= fmjm 62 D
1
[D
2
[D
3
g
g(m) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
a if m 2 D
1
a
0
(; 
0
) if m 2 D
2
a
0
j
(a; ) if m 2 D
3
b
i(m)
(m
2
i(m)
) if m 2 D
4
This mechanism can be described in the following way. If everybody agrees on an outcome
and a state, then that outcome is implemented. If just one person disagrees with that
announcement, and this person is the test agent and it announces the test outcome, then
the test outcome is implemented. If just one person disagrees with that announcement,
and this person is not the test agent (or it is the test agent but she does not announce the
test outcome), then the dissenter is punished. If more than one person disagrees, then
the outcome is the favorite one for the agent who announces the largest integer.
The only dierence between this mechanism and the one in Repullo (1987) is that in this
one we punish deviations from the equilibrium by agents other than the test agent, (and
even punish announcements by the test agent which are not part of the test pair).
3.2 The dynamics of Nash implementation
The main result in this section is that with the dynamics dened in section 2 for the
game that is dened by the mechanism in subsection 3.1 the population prole eventually
induces one of the outcomes that the designer wants to implement with probability one,
and that outcome is then implemented forever. In addition, if the initial state is homoge-
neous and none of the outcomes that the designer wants to implement are already being
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implemented, all outcomes in the social choice function are implemented with positive
probability.
As we said in section 2, we need to modify assumption (D2) to account for the fact
that the strategy spaces are innite since we need that some transition probabilities are
bounded away from zero. The strategies that improve upon the one currently in use can
be partitioned into a nite number of sets in which the strategies only dier with respect
to the integer that is named. We assume (only in this section) that at least one strategy
in each of these sets is used with a probability that is bounded away from zero.
Dene the set S
a
= fsj9; such that 8a 2 F (); i; and k;m
ik
= (a; ; n
ik
)g. The set S
a
is the set of population proles where in all games played in the population the message
prole is in the set D
1
, and the outcome is a.
Proposition 1. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy prop-
erties (D1), (D2), (D3), and given a social choice function that satises (N1), (N2), (N3);
(a) If s(0) is a homogeneous population prole such that s(0) 62 S
a
for any a 2 , then
for all a 2  P (for some t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
8t  t
0
) > 0.
(b) P ([
a2F ()
ffor some t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
;8t  t
0
g) = 1.
Proof: The proof will proceed through a series of lemmas. First we will show that for
any population prole the population can become a homogeneous population prole with
positive probability. Then we will show that a homogeneous population prole which does
not implement any social choice function outcome can lead to all homogeneous proles
whose outcomes are social choice function outcomes, and nally we will show that a
population prole in S
a
, where everybody announces the true preference prole cannot
exit that set.
Lemma 1: Let any s(t
0
). Then P (s(t) 2 S
hom
for some t > t
0
) > 0.
Proof: By the denition of u
ik
(s; ), u
ik
1
(s; ) = u
ik
2
(s; ), if m
ik
1
= m
ik
2
, and therefore,
for any given prole s
 i
, the set of best responses for all individuals in role i is identical.
Suppose that all individuals in role 1 are called upon to move in sequence. This is an
event that has positive probability by property (D1). Since s
 1
does not change along
that sequence of moves, the set of best responses for agents in role 1 does not change.
Suppose that they all change to the same best response m

1
. This has positive probability
by property (D2). There is also positive probability that an analogous succession of events
that lead to all agents in role 1 to play m

1
will lead to all individuals in role i to play
some m

i
, without an intervening chance for individuals in roles j < i to change their
strategies. This will lead then with positive probability to a homogeneous prole s with
s
i
= (m

i
; :::;m

i
).2
Lemma 2: Let the true preference prole be  and let s(t
0
) 62 S
a
and s(t
0
) 2 S
hom
. Then,
for all a 2 F (), P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
) > 0.
Proof: Given a homogeneous population message prole s, let m(s) 2M be the message
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prole associated to the homogeneous prole s. In the proof this lemma, all the strategy
shifts that we will consider are shifts by all the individuals who are in the same role
in sequence. Therefore expressions like \agent i will update her message", have to be
understood as \all individuals in the role of agent i will update their message". The proof
will proceed by dividing the possible initial states into a series of subsets.
Claim 1. For a given , if s(t
0
) 62 S
a
, for any a 2 F () and s(t
0
) in S
hom
and m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
1
,
then P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and m(s(t)) 2 D
4
) > 0.
Since s(t
0
) 2 D
1
and s(t
0
) 62 S
a
all agents must be announcing a preference prole 
0
6= .
By assumption (N1) and the denition of the mechanism, agent i(; 
0
) can improve her
payo by announcing . Then with positive probability, by assumptions (D1) and (D2),
agent i(; 
0
) will have a chance to update and will choose to announce . After agent
i(; 
0
) changes her announcement , any agent i 6= i(; 
0
) announcing state  will move
the message prole to a state in D
4
. If at the same time she announces a high enough
integer so that i = i(m), then it will be advantageous to do so. Therefore this will happen
with positive probability by (D2).2
Claim 2. Let s(t
0
) in S
hom
and m(s(0)) 2 D
2
. Then P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and
m(s(t)) 2 D
4
) > 0.
If m(s(t
0
)) is in D
2
, m
i
(s(t
0
)) = (a
0
; 
0
; n
i
) for all i 6= i(
0
; 
00
). Any agent other than
i(
0
; 
00
) can move the message prole to D
4
by announcing a dierent outcome than a
0
.
If she also chooses an integer high enough, and the true preference prole , she can
obtain b
i
(), which is a best response to s(t
0
). Assumptions (D1) and (D2) guarantee
that this happens with positive probability. 2
Claim 3. Let s(t
0
) in S
hom
and m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
3
. Then P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and
m(s(t)) 2 D
4
) > 0.
If m(s(t
0
)) is in D
3
, m
i
(s(t
0
)) = (a
0
; 
0
; n
i
) for all i 6= j. Any agent other than j can move
the message prole to D
4
by announcing a dierent outcome than a
0
, and by choosing an
integer high enough, and the true preference prole  (which may or may not be equal to

0
), she can obtain b
j
(
0
), which is a best response to s(t
0
). Assumptions (D1) and (D2)
guarantee that this happens with positive probability. 2
Claim 4. Let the true preference prole be  and a 2 F (). Let s(t) in S
hom
and
m(s(t)) 2 D
4
. Then P (for some t
0
> t; s(t
0
) 2 S
hom
and m
i
(s(t
0
)) = (a; ; n
i
)) > 0.
If m(s(t)) 2 D
4
, there must be at least three dierent messages, and at least two of them
have to be dierent from (a; ). Call these reports, (a
1
; 
1
), (a
2
; 
2
), and the agents that
send these messages i
1
and i
2
respectively. Let agents i with i 6= i
1
and i 6= i
2
, replace
their messages by (a; ). These replacements still give rise to proles in D
4
and they are
best responses, provided that agents also announce the highest integer, thus assumptions
(D1) and (D2) guarantee that they are sent with positive probability. Now we have to
distinguish two cases.
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(a) i
1
= i(; 
1
), and (m
1
i
1
;m
2
i
1
) = (a(; 
1
); 
1
) and i
2
= i(; 
2
), and (m
1
i
2
;m
2
i
2
) =
(a(; 
2
); 
2
)
(b) i
1
6= i(; 
1
), or i
1
= i(; 
1
) and (m
1
i
1
;m
2
i
1
) 6= (a(; 
1
); 
1
); or i
2
6= i(; 
2
), or
i
2
= i(; 
2
) and (m
1
i
2
;m
2
i
2
) 6= (a(; 
2
); 
2
).
That is, either both i
1
and i
2
are test agents announcing test pairs, or one of them is not.
Let's start with case (b). Suppose i
1
fails to be a test agent announcing a test pair (this
is without loss of generality). If agent i
2
replaced her message with (a; ; n
i
2
), this would
lead to a prole in D
3
, and the outcome would be a
0
i
1
(a; ) (since there would be only
one dissenter, and this dissenter would not be a test agent announcing a test pair). But
by assumption (N2) agent i
2
prefers a
0
i
1
(a; ) to a and, by (N3) this is an improvement
over b
j(m)
for j(m) 6= i
2
, which is the current outcome, and thus i
2
replaces her message
with (a; ; n
i
2
) with positive probability. Once agent i
2
announces (a; ; n
i
2
) the outcome
is a
0
i
1
(a; ): If i
1
then announces (a; ), the prole will be in S
a
. By assumption (N2) this
is a best response for i
1
, since a
0
i
1
(a; ) is worse than a for i
1
, so i
1
will announce (a; )
with positive probability.
In case (a) i
1
can replace her announcement by (a
0
; ), with a
0
6= a. This preserves the
state in D
4
and is a best response provided i
1
announces the highest integer. But now we
are almost in the case (b) again. The only dierence from case (b) is that i
1
is choosing the
highest integer. But with positive probability some player other than i
1
and i
2
will move
now and announce the highest integer, (which is a best response) and then the state will
be like in case (b). At this point we can apply the argument in the previous paragraph
to show that the transition to S
a
has positive probability. 2
Lemma 3: Let the true preference prole be  and let s(t) 2 S
a
for a 2 F () and
m
1
ik
(t) = , for all i; k. Then s(t
0
) 2 S
a
for all t
0
> t.
Proof: If s(t) 2 S
a
, all message proles for all possible matches are in D
1
and the out-
come is a. The only replacements that can change something (since only one individual
changes each time) will lead that game to a prole in D
2
or D
3
. Since m
1
ik
(t) = , for all
i; k assumptions (N1) and (N2) guarantee that these replacements do not mean an im-
provement for any agent, since a test agent announcing a test outcome for another prole

0
will obtain v
i
(a(; 
0
); ) < v
i
(a
0
; ) by (N2) and any other deviating announcement
(a
0
; 
0
) obtains v
i
(a
0
i
(a; ); ) < v
i
(a; ) by (N3). Since deviating messages produce strict
losses, assumption (D3) guarantees that they will not be made. 2
The combination of Lemmas 2 and 3 establishes part (a) of Proposition 1, since Lemma
2 shows that from any homogeneous prole the population reaches any S
a
(for a 2 F ())
with positive probability and Lemma 3 shows that once the population is in S
a
it never
leaves the set. With the addition of Lemma 1 we have that from any state there is a
probability  > 0 of reaching [
a2F ()
S
a
and staying there forever in a number of steps
smaller than some xed and nite k. So the probability of not reaching [
a2F ()
S
a
in kn
steps is 
kn
. Since lim
n!1

kn
= 0, part (b) follows.2
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3.3 A little further away from the canonical mechanism
Proposition 1 shows that the canonical game is not a bad idea from a dynamic point of
view. One may still question it, however, on the grounds that integer games and similar
constructions are very strange and they may not be \realistically implementable" (is there
enough time in the universe life span to describe any arbitrary integer?
2
)
From a purely dynamic point of view the assumption that all strategies that improve
weakly upon the presently used one are taken with positive probability seems suspicious,
especially given that strategies that do not improve are used with probability zero.
The answer to these questions is that under some assumptions on the permissible prefer-
ence proles one can construct a mechanism that does not use integer games and satises
the good dynamic properties of the canonical mechanism, even with more restrictive re-
quirements on the dynamics.
To be more precise, assumption (D2) will be replaced by assumption (D4). As for the
assumptions that the preferences have to satisfy, we will drop (N3) and will add two
others.
(N4) There exists an outcome P such that for all i; a; , with a 2 F () v
i
(a; ) > v
i
(P; ).
(N5) For all , 
0
, i 6= i(; 
0
), v
i
(P; )  v
i
(a
0
(; 
0
); ).
Assumption (N4) creates a punishment that is worse than anything the designer wants to
implement for everybody. We think of this as a kind of perverse \status quo" to which the
situation will revert if there is widespread disagreement among the agents. Assumption
(N5) tells us that if the test agent of the monotonicity condition denounces the other
members of the group, the test outcome is implemented, and this is at least as bad for
the \liars" as the P outcome.
LetM
i
= AS, each individual announces an outcome and a preference prole. As before,
M = M
1
 :::M
n
, and members of M
i
and M are denoted m
i
and m respectively. The
rst component of m
i
, that is, the outcome announced by agent i is m
1
i
and the second
component, the preference prole announced by agent i, is m
2
i
. To dene g, we divide M
into three regions,
D
1
= fmj9 2 S; a 2 F () such that for all i; m
i
= (a; )g
D
2
= fmj8i 6= i(; 
0
);m
i
= (a; )and m
i(;
0
)
= (a
0
(; 
0
); 
0
)g
D
3
= fmjm 62 D
1
[D
2
g
2
One should note that this criticism is not valid for mechanisms with `modulo' games, which have the
same dynamic properties as the canonical mechanism
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g(m) =
8
>
<
>
:
a if m 2 D
1
a
0
(; 
0
) if m 2 D
2
P if m 2 D
3
The explanation of this mechanism is similar to the canonical mechanism. If everybody
agrees on an outcome and a state, that outcome is implemented. If just one person
disagrees with that announcement, and this person is the test agent and she announces the
test outcome, the test outcome is implemented. Otherwise, the outcome P is implemented.
One can see immediately that this mechanism does not implement the social choice func-
tion in Nash equilibria. Besides the equilibria that implement the social choice function,
there are many other equilibria whose outcome is P . However, we will show that all
equilibria, except the ones that implement outcomes of the social choice function, are
unstable.
It turns out that with the dynamics dened in section 2 (even if we replace assumption
(D2) for the harder to satisfy (D4)) the same conclusions obtained for Proposition 1 follow.
Dene the set S
a
= fsj9; such that 8a 2 F (); i; and k;m
ik
= (a; )g.
Proposition 2. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy prop-
erties (D1), (D2), (D4), and given a social choice function that satises (N1), (N2), (N4),
(N5);
(a) If s(0) is a homogeneous population prole such that s(0) 62 S
a
for any a 2 , then
for all a 2  P (for some t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
8t  t
0
) > 0.
(b) P ([
a2F ()
ffor some t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
;8t  t
0
g) = 1.
Proof: As with the proof of proposition 1, we will proceed through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 4: Let any s(t
0
). Then P (s(t) 2 S
hom
for some t > t
0
) > 0:
Proof: Same as Lemma 1. 2.
Lemma 5: Let the true preference prole be  and let s(t
0
) 62 S
a
and s(t
0
) 2 S
hom
. Then,
for all a 2 F (), P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
a
) > 0.
Proof:
Claim 5. If s(t
0
) 62 S
a
, for any a 2 F () and s(t
0
) in S
hom
and m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
1
, then
P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and m(s(t)) 2 D
3
) > 0.
Since s(t
0
) 62 S
a
and m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
1
everybody must be announcing a preference prole

0
6= . By assumption (N1), and by the denition of the mechanism, it is a best response
for agent i(; 
0
) to announce . Then with positive probability, by assumptions (D1)
and (D4), agent i(; 
0
) will have a chance to update and will choose to announce ,
which moves the prole to D
2
. After agent i(; 
0
) changes her announcement, any agent
i 6= i(; 
0
) announcing state  will move the message prole to a state in D
3
, and since
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she can only move the game to D
3
or stay in D
2
, and P is a better outcome for i 6= i(; 
0
)
by assumption (N5), announcing  is a best response . Therefore this will happen with
positive probability by (D4).2
Claim 6. Let s(t
0
) in S
hom
and m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
2
. Then P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and
m(s(t)) 2 D
3
) > 0.
If m(s(t
0
)) is in D
2
, m
i
(s(t
0
)) = (a
0
; 
0
) for all i 6= i(
0
; 
00
). Any agent other than i(
0
; 
00
)
can move the message to D
3
by announcing a dierent outcome than a
0
, which is a best
response to s(t
0
), by (N5). Assumptions (D1) and (D2) guarantee that this happens with
positive probability. 2
Claim 7. Let the true preference prole be  and a 2 F (). Let s(t
0
) in S
hom
and
m(s(t
0
)) 2 D
3
. Then P (for some t > t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
and m
i
(s(t)) = (a; )) > 0.
We can distinguish two cases.
(a) There exists some i
1
such that m
i
1
6= (a; ) and either i
i
6= i(; 
1
), for all 
1
2 S or
m
i
1
6= (a(; 
1
); 
1
).
(b) For all i, either i = (a; ), or i = i(; 
1
), for some 
1
2 S and m
i
1
= (a(; 
1
); 
1
).
That is, of all the agents that are not already announcing (a; ), either there is one which
is not a test agent announcing a test pair or all are test agents and announce test pairs.
In case (a) if all agents other than agent i
1
change their messages to (a; ), the outcome
is still P and it is a best response. If then i
1
changes her message to (a; ), the outcome
is a and this is a best response by assumption (N4).
In case (b) there must be at least two agents that are test agents announcing test outcomes,
or m(s(t)) would not be in D
3
. Let one of them be i
1
, and let m
i
1
change to (; a
0
) for
a
0
6= a. This keeps the prole in D
3
and it is a best response. But now we are in case (a)
2.
Lemma 6: Let the true preference prole be  and let s(t
0
) 2 S
a
for a 2 F () and
m
1
ik
(t
0
) = , for all i; k. Then s(t) 2 S
a
for all t > t
0
.
Proof: Like Lemma 3. 2
The combination of Lemmas 5 and 6 establishes part (a) of Proposition 2, since Lemma
5 shows that from any homogeneous prole the population reaches any S
a
(for a 2 F ())
with positive probability and Lemma 6 shows that once the population is in S
a
it never
leaves the set. With the addition of Lemma 4 we have that from any state there is a
probability  > 0 of reaching [
a2F ()
S
a
and staying there forever in a number of steps
smaller than some xed and nite k. So the probability of not reaching [
a2F ()
S
a
in kn
steps is 
kn
. Since lim
n!1

kn
= 0, part (b) follows.2
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4 Rened and virtual Implementation
4.1 Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
So far, we have only considered implementation in Nash equilibrium.What about more
sophisticated equilibrium concepts? Since the seminal work of Moore and Repullo (1988),
there has been considerable interest in implementation with more rened equilibrium con-
cepts. The main advantage of these mechanisms is that the conditions for implementation
are weaker. In particular monotonicity is no longer required. This is important since in
economic environments implementing a single-valued social choice function and requir-
ing monotonicity is equivalent to truthful implementation in undominated strategies (see
Moore 1992).
By comparison, implementation in undominated strategies requires basically no restric-
tions. Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that \any social choice function is exactly
implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies", and Sjostrom (1994) \in
economic environments any social choice rule can be implemented in undominated Nash
equilibria". An additional advantage of some of these mechanisms (notably those of Abreu
and Matsushima (1994) and Sjostrom (1994)) is that \integer games" or \modulo games"
are not used.
The purpose of this section is to show that these advances should be viewed with some
suspicion if we believe that equilibrium is the outcome of a learning process, since the
adaptive dynamic process leads to undesired outcomes even asymptotically.
To focus the discussion we will concentrate on the mechanism proposed by Abreu and
Matsushima (henceforth AM) (1994), but the results can be extended to other mechanisms
based on renements that have been proposed in the literature.
We will begin by introducing some notation and describing the mechanism.
The rst thing to notice is that AM (1994) only consider single-valued social choice
functions. Another important assumption is that there is a private good that can be used
to levy (small) nes. Thus the utility function will be v
i
: AR
i
! R . For simplicity
we will use (as AM (1994) does) the quasi linear utility function v
i
(a; t; 
i
) = u
i
(a; 
i
)+t
i
.
Besides the outcome function g(M) the mechanism species a transfer rule, t = (t
i
)
i2N
:
M ! R
n
. The message space will be,
M
i
= 
i
 
i+1
 S  : : : S = M
 1
i
M
0
i
M
1
i
 : : :M
K
i
;
where K is an integer to be specied. By the lemma in AM (1992) we have that there
exists a function f
i
: 
i
! A, such that for every 
i
2 
i
,
u
i
(f
i
(
i
); 
i
) > u
i
(f
i
(
0
i
); 
i
) for all 
0
i
2 
i
=f
i
g:
Let m = (m
1
; : : : ;m
n
), m
i
= (m
 1
i
;m
0
i
; : : : ;m
n
i
), and m
h
= (m
h
1
; : : : ;m
h
n
). For any
15
message prole m, the outcome function is,
g(m) =
e(m
0
; : : : ;m
K
)
n
X
i2I
f
i
(m
 1
i
) +
1   e(m
0
; : : : ;m
K
)
K
K
X
h=1
(m
h
);
where for each h = 1; : : : ;K, we dene  :M
h
! A by
(m
h
) =
(
F () if m
h
i
=  for at least (n  1) agents
b otherwise;where b is an arbitrary element of A
and if we let  be a small positive number to be specied later, and
~m
0
= (m
0
n
;m
0
1
; : : : ;m
0
n 1
), we dene e :M
0
 : : :M
K
! R by
e(m
h
) =
(
 if m
h
i
6= ~m
0
for some h 2 f1; : : : ;Kg and some i 2 I
0 otherwise
The outcome function g is a lottery with the following characteristics. With a probability
determined by the function e (which is nonzero when some agent's hth announcement
diers from ~m
0
) the favorite outcome of agent i, given her m
 1
i
announcement, is selected
with probability 1=n. With probability 1   e another lottery is chosen which gives equal
weight to the K outcome functions given by the functions (m
h
). This function says
that if all but one of the m
h
i
announcements coincide on , then F () is implemented,
otherwise an arbitrary outcome b is implemented.
To nish the determination of the mechanism the penalty function has to be specied.
Let ; ;  be small positive numbers to be specied later. Three possible penalties are
specied for each player i.
1.  if his zeroth announcement diers from player (i+1)'s minusoneth announcement.
2.  if his hth announcement (h  1) is the rst to dier from ~m
0
: All players who are
rst to deviate are punished.
3.  if his hth announcement is the only one to dier from the other players' hth
announcements.
We will now give names to the nes
 (m
 1
i+1
;m
0
i
) =
(
  if m
 1
i+1
6= m
0
i
0 otherwise
d
i
(m
0
; : : : ;m
K
) =
8
>
<
>
:
 
if m
h
i
6= ~m
0
and m
h
0
j
= ~m
0
for some h 2 f1; : : : ;Kg and
some i 2 I; all j 2 I; and all h
0
2 f1; : : : ; h  1g
0 otherwise
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h
i
(m
h
) =
(
  if for some ; m
h
i
6= ; but m
h
j
=  for all j 2 I=fig;
0 otherwise
The total ne is thus t
i
(m) =  (m
 1
i+1
;m
0
i
) + d
i
(m
0
; : : : ;m
K
) +
P
K
h=1

h
i
(m
h
):
To nish with the description of the implementation game we need to dene the constants
K; ; ;  and . To do this dene rst,
E
i
(
i
) = max
m
 1
2M
 1
;m
h
2M
h






1
n
X
j2I
u
i
(f
j
(m
 1
j
); 
i
)  u
i
((m
h
); 
i
)






D
i
(
i
) = max
m
h
2M
h
; m
h
i
2M
h
i
n
u
i
((m
h
); 
i
)  u
i
((m
h
 i
; m
h
i
); 
i
)
o
Fix  (small) and K (large) and choose ;  and  to satisfy
Assumption AM1
 > E
i
(
i
)
 >
1
K
D
i
(
i
) + 
 > E
i
(
i
) + 
With these three inequalities AM (1994) show the following lemmas,
Lemma 7. Under assumption AM1. Let any m
i
, and m
i
= (
i
;m
0
i
; : : : ;m
K
i
), then for
all m
 i
,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
Lemma 8. Under assumption AM1. For all m with m
 1
i
= 
i
for all i if we let m
i
=
(
i
; 
i+1
;m
1
i
: : : ;m
K
i
)
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
) > v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
Lemma 9. Under assumption AM1. For all m with m
 1
i
= 
i
, m
0
i
= 
i+1
and m
q
i
= 
for all q 2 f1; : : : ; h  1g, if we let m
q
i
= m
q
i
for all q 6= h and m
q
i
=  then,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
) > v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
We now show that if the lemmas are true, dynamics like those described in section 2 will
go with positive probability to a state where the social choice function is implemented.
Proposition 3. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy
properties (D1), (D2), (D3), if Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 are satised, P (for some t; s(t) 2
S
F ()
) > 0.
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Proof: For this proof we rst need some lemmas.
Lemma 10: Let any s(t
0
). Then P (for some t  t
0
; s(t) 2 S
hom
) > 0.
Proof: Same as Lemma 1. 2.
Lemma 11: Let s(t
0
) 2 S
hom
Then P (for some t  t
0
; s(t) 2 S
F ()
) > 0.
Proof: Let s(t
0
) 2 S
hom
. Then with positive probability the players will change their
messages one by one so that m
 1
ki
(t
 1
) = 
ik
for all i; k and some t
 1
> t. That is, the
minusoneth announcement of all players will be their true preferences. This happens be-
cause by Lemma 7 announcing the agent's own type truthfully in the minusoneth position
is weakly dominant so assumptions D1 and D2 guarantee this will happen with positive
probability. Similarly Lemmas 8 and assumption D1 and D2 guarantee that with positive
probability there is a t
0
> t
 1
such that m
 1
ki
(t
0
) = 
i
; m
0
ki
(t
0
) = 
i+1
for all i; k and
Lemma 9 and assumption D1 and D2 guarantee that there is a sequence of time periods,
t
h
> t
q
for q < h such that m
 1
ki
(t
h
) = 
i
m
0
ki
(t
h
) = 
i+1
m
q
ki
(t
h
) =  for all i; k and q < h
Let then t
0
= t
K
2
This shows that the mechanism of AM (1994) can lead to the social choice function to be
implemented. Unfortunately, it is also possible to diverge from the equilibrium in which
the social choice function is implemented.
Proposition 4. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy
properties (D1), (D2), (D3), if s(t) 2 S
F ()
, then P (for some t
0
 t; s(t
0
) 2 S
F (
~
)
) > 0 for
any
~
.
Proof: If s(t) 2 S
F ()
, then if agent n changes m
 1
n
to some 
0
n
6= 
n
, her payo does
not change by the denition of the mechanism. D1 and D2 guarantee that this happens
with positive probability. Let
~
 be such that
~

n
= 
0
and
~

i
=  for all i 6= n . Through
a series of claims we show that with positive probability the population message prole
goes to S
F (
~
)
that is, F (
~
) is implemented.
Claim 1. If m
 1
=
~
;m
0
i
= 
i+1
for all i 2 I and m
h
i
=  for all i 2 I and h  1, then
v
n 1
(g( m
n 1
;m
 (n 1)
); t( m
n 1
;m
 (n 1)
); 
n 1
)  v
n 1
(g(m); t(m); 
n 1
) < 0
where m
n 1
= (
~

n 1
;
~

n
;
~
; ; : : : ; )
v
n 1
(g( m
n 1
;m
 (n 1)
); t( m
n 1
;m
 (n 1)
); 
n 1
)  v
n 1
(g(m); t(m); 
n 1
)
=   + x() 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )x()

< 0
where the equality follows from the denition of the mechanism and the inequality follows
from Assumption AM1.2
Claim 2. If m
 1
=
~
;m
0
i
=
~

i+1
for all i 2 I and m
1
i
2
n
~
; 
o
(with at least m
1
n 1
=
~
)
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and m
h
i
=  for all i 2 I and h  2, then
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
) < 0
where m
i
= (
~

i
;
~

i
;
~
; ; : : : ; )
If m
1
i
=
~
 only for i = n  1,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )x() 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K 1
K
x() + b

< 0
If m
1
i
=
~
 for more than 1 but less than n  2 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K 1
K
x() + b

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K 1
K
x() + b

< 0
If m
1
i
=
~
 for n   2 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K 1
K
x() + b

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K 1
K
x() + x(
~
)

< 0
If m
1
i
=
~
 for n   1 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K 1
K
x() + x(
~
)

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K 1
K
x() + x(
~
)

< 0
where the equalities follow from the denition of the mechanismand the inequalities follow
from Assumption AM1.2
Claim 3. If m
 1
=
~
;m
0
i
=
~

i+1
for all i 2 I and m
h
i
=
~
 for all i 2 I and h  p, and
m
h
i
=  for all i 2 I and h > p, then
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
) < 0
where m
i
is such that m
 1
i
=
~

i
; m
0
i
=
~

i+1
and m
h
i
=
~
 for all h  p+ 1 and m
h
i
=  for
all h > p + 1,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K p
K
x() + px(
~
)

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K p
K
x() + px(
~
)

< 0
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where the equality follows from the denition of the mechanism and the inequality follows
from Assumption AM1.2
Claim 4. If m
 1
=
~
;m
0
i
=
~

i+1
for all i 2 I and m
h
i
=
~
 for all i 2 I and h  p,
m
p+1
i
2
n
~
; 
o
(with at least one i such that m
p+1
i
=
~
) and m
h
i
=  for all i 2 I and
h > p+ 1, then
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
) < 0
where m
i
is such that m
 1
i
=
~

i
; m
0
i
=
~

i+1
and m
h
i
=
~
 for all h  p+ 1 and m
h
i
=  for
all h > p + 1,
If m
p+1
i
=
~
 only for 1 individual,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K p
K
x() +
p
K
x(
~
)

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K p 1
K
x() +
p
K
x(
~
) +
1
K
b

< 0
If m
p+1
i
=
~
 for more than 1 but less than n  2 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K p 1
K
x() +
p
K
x(
~
) +
1
K
b

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K p 1
K
x() +
p
K
x(
~
) +
1
K
b

< 0
If m
1
i
=
~
 for n   2 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K p 1
K
x() +
p
K
x(
~
) +
1
K
b

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K p 1
K
x() +
p+1
K
x(
~
)

< 0
If m
1
i
=
~
 for n   1 individuals,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
=   +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1   )

K p 1
K
x() +
p+1
K
x(
~
)

 

  +

n
P
i2I
f(
~

i
) + (1  )

K p 1
K
x() +
p+1
K
x(
~
)

< 0
where the equalities follow from the denition of the mechanismand the inequalities follow
from Assumption AM1.2
The claims show that S
F (
~
)
is attained with positive probability because they show a
series of changes in the messages, all of which are improving. Thus assumptions D1 and
D2 guarantee that the sequence will take place with positive probability.
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We have shown that there is positive probability of a transition between S
F ()
and S
F (
~
)
where
~
 diers from  only in 
0
n
6= 
n
. But if the s(t) 2 S
F (
~
)
, it is costless for individual
n  1 to change m
 1
n 1
= 
0
n 1
6= 
n 1
. By applying analogs of Claims 1 through 4 we can
then show that with positive probability there is a time t
0
such that s(t
0
) 2 S
F (

)
, where

 = (
1
; : : : ; 
0
n 1
; 
0
n
). If we iterate this argument, the result follows.2
4.2 Virtual implementation
The idea behind virtual implementation is that to obtain implementability results un-
der weaker sucient conditions one can relax the notion of implementation (instead of
strengthening the equilibrium concept). After all, the planner may well be satised as
long as the social choice function is implemented with a high probability. AM (1992)
show that if the planner only requires that the social choice function is implemented with
arbitrarily high probability, basically any social choice function can be implemented, even
with such a simple solution concept as iterative strictly undominated strategies.
This result would appear to be very congenial with the spirit of this paper. Since the so-
lution concept is iterative strictly undominated strategies, both convergence and stability
would be expected not only under the dynamics of this paper, but in a variety of evolu-
tionary and learning models (see Nachbar 1990, Samuelson and Zhang 1992 or Cabrales
and Sobel 1992). There is a problem, however, if the planner wants to implement a social
choice function which is -close to the original social choice function. In that case some
of the dominated strategies which have to be eliminated for the process to converge are
only -strictly dominated. In fact we will show that if the agents are basically indier-
ent between strategies that give them utilities that are -close, then the same instability
problems of the mechanisms of the previous subsection are reproduced here.
Following AM (1992), we say that a social choice function x and y are -close if for all
preference proles x and y map to lotteries that are -close. A social choice function x is
virtually implementable in iterative strictly undominated strategies if for all  > 0, there
exists a social choice function y which is -close to x and which is exactly implementable
in iterative strictly undominated strategies.
To make the presentation a little simpler, we will not use the same mechanism that AM
(1992) use but a modication based on AM (1994). As before we use the quasi linear utility
function v
i
(a; t; 
i
) = u
i
(a; 
i
) + t
i
. Besides the outcome function g(M) the mechanism
species a transfer rule, t = (t
i
)
i2N
: M ! R
n
. The message space will again be,
M
i
= 
i
 
i+1
 S  : : : S = M
 1
i
M
0
i
M
1
i
 : : :M
K
i
;
Let m = (m
1
; : : : ;m
n
), m
i
= (m
 1
i
;m
0
i
; : : : ;m
n
i
), and m
h
= (m
h
1
; : : : ;m
h
n
). The only
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change in the mechanism is that for any message prole m, the outcome function is now,
g(m) =

n
X
i2I
f
i
(m
 1
i
) +
1  
K
K
X
h=1
(m
h
);
where for each h = 1; : : : ;K, we dene  : M
h
! A as before and  is a small positive
number as in the denition of virtual implementation. The penalty functions are also as
specied before.
Note that with the modication made in the mechanism Lemma 7 is now true with a
strict inequality.
Lemma 12. Under assumption AM1. Let any m
i
, and m
i
= (
i
;m
0
i
; : : : ;m
K
i
), then for
all m
 6i
,
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
) > v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
)
Proof: Trivial from the proof of our lemma 7, and the denition of the mechanism.2
Lemma 12, plus lemmas 8 and 9 implies that implementation is in iterative strictly un-
dominated strategies. Note also that the function implemented now is not F exactly but
it is -close to F . Since  can be made arbitrarily small, this mechanism virtually imple-
ments F . Let's denote the social choice function that is actually implemented for each
value of , F

:
Proposition 5. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy
properties (D1), (D2), and (D3), if Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 are satised, for all s(0) there
exists t
0
such that P (for all t  t
0
; s(t) 2 S
F

()
) = 1.
Proof: A straightforward modication of the proof of proposition 3 shows that with prob-
ability 1 there exists t
0
such that s(t
0
) 2 S
F

()
and the message m
i
= (
i
; 
i+1
; ; : : : ; )
is sent by all players. Lemmas 12, 8 and 9 show then that for all m
i
6= m
i
;
v
i
(g( m
i
;m
 i
); t( m
i
;m
 i
); 
i
)  v
i
(g(m); t(m); 
i
) < 0
so by Assumption D3 P (for all t  t
0
; s(t) 2 S
F

()
) = 1:2
So, as mentioned earlier, the mechanism proposed guarantees very easily convergence and
stability to a message prole that implements the social choice function with arbitrarily
high probability, under assumptions (D1), (D2) and (D3).
The problem arises if assumption (D2) is replaced by (D5). We can then show,
Proposition 6. Let the true preference prole be . Given dynamics that satisfy
properties (D1), (D3), (D5) if s(t) 2 S
F ()
, then P (for some t
0
 t; s(t
0
) 2 S
F (
~
)
) > 0 for
any
~
.
Proof: If s(t) 2 S
F ()
, then if agent n changes m
 1
n
to some 
0
n
6= 
n
, her payo does
not change by more than M by the denition of the mechanism. Thus, D1 and D5
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guarantees that this happens with positive probability. The rest of the proof retraces the
steps of proposition 4 closely.2
This result implies that the agents have to care about the outcomes of the implementa-
tion process orders of magnitude more than the planner to avoid the instability of the
mechanism. While this may be justied under certain circumstances, it is by no means a
foregone conclusion.
5 Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that thinking explicitly about the equilibrating process
in the implementation problem can be a fruitful experience. For example, one possible
interpretation of the criticism of complexity that is levied against some general mecha-
nisms is that boundedly rational agents cannot successfully achieve the equilibrium of the
game. If this were the right interpretation, the criticism would be wrong, which at the
very least should challenge the critics into making the criticism more concrete.
A possible reply to this result could be that it doesn't matter very much since we know that
there are mechanisms that implement more things without using unnatural mechanisms.
Our answer to this is that these mechanisms are objectionable since under reasonable
dynamics the desired outcomes are not stable.
We hope that both of these results encourage more work into the implementation problem
using dynamic tools. An important question that should be answered is how sensitive are
our conclusions to the dynamics postulated. We suspect that the negative result about
implementation in undominated strategies is bound to be robust to modications of the
dynamics. The result about the Nash mechanism may be more sensitive. In particular,
we have not answered the question about the speed of adjustment. Reaching the social
equilibrium may be irrelevant if it takes a very long time. It is possibly here where the
critics of \unnatural" mechanisms may nd a defense for their positions.
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